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INTRODUCTION
T
his article proposes a method to account for the concur-
rent environmental benefits of stratospheric ozone pro-
tection and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reductions when
evaluating investments in new technologies. The method demon-
strates how the phaseout of ozone-depleting substances
(“ODSs”) under the Montreal Protocol can be consistent with
climate policy when the global warming potential and energy-
efficiency characteristics of substitute technologies are fully
considered. This approach would increase investment to rapidly
phase out ODSs, resulting in significant environmental benefits
by avoiding both climate change and increased incidence of
harmful ultraviolet radiation. This article illustrates the possi-
bility of gains from coordinating global warming and ozone
depletion policies through a modification of the Montreal Proto-
col on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer to allow pro-
duction and consumption of
HCFC-123 when GHG emis-
sions are reduced to near zero
levels and these emissions are
offset by collecting and destroy-
ing ODSs contained in existing
equipment and foam — sources





Although the physical and
chemical processes responsible
for depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer and climate change
are related,1 coordination between the Montreal Protocol and the
global effort to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference”2
in the climate system has been limited and unsystematic. The
Montreal Protocol does not properly take account of the global
warming impacts of the ODSs it regulates or the greenhouse gas
hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”) that are chemical replacements
for some applications. The Kyoto Protocol, on the other hand,
excludes from its list of controlled substances those covered by
the Montreal Protocol. As such, economic incentives under
Kyoto cannot be applied to a more rapid phase-out of ODS
greenhouse gas production and consumption, or to the collection
and destruction of ODSs contained in refrigeration and air con-
ditioning equipment and thermal insulating foam.3 One could
argue that this construction of the Kyoto list of controlled sub-
stances implicitly empowers the Montreal Protocol to address
the global warming impacts of the substances it regulates; how-
ever, this option has not yet been exercised by the Parties to the
Montreal treaty. More significantly, the Multilateral Fund of the
Montreal Protocol has no access to Clean Development Mecha-
nism funds under the Kyoto Protocol, and the emissions trading
options of Kyoto cannot be applied directly to ODSs.
COORDINATING ENVIRONMENTAL EFFORTS
Given the interaction between the stratospheric ozone layer
and the climate system, and the fact that all the ODSs regulated
by the Montreal Protocol (with the exception of halons) are pow-
erful GHGs,4 coordination of the two regulatory regimes is nec-
essary to effectively address the environmental concerns at
stake. Yet, it is not easy to see how this can be done in practice.
For example, how might the environmental and economic desir-
ability of two projects, both of
which affect greenhouse gas
emissions and emissions of
ODSs, be compared? 
The net benefits from the
climate change mitigation and
ozone layer protection aspects of
the projects are extraordinarily
difficult to quantify.5 The aggre-
gate benefits can be monetized
only by making highly con-
testable assumptions about the
“value of a statistical life” across
countries in different stages of
development. A method for
comparing costs and benefits
across generations has not been agreed upon. A major compo-
nent of the benefit of climate stabilization depends on what
assumption is made about risk aversion (and not all those
affected can be presumed to share a common degree of risk aver-
sion). Estimates of the cost of greenhouse gas reductions range
from negative to positive, with the magnitudes of the positive
cost estimates differing by a factor of four.6 Even if the aggre-
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gate impacts were known with more certainty than seems possi-
ble with today’s knowledge, the response curves of impacts to
changes in GHG or ODS emissions are almost certainly non-lin-
ear. Therefore, the marginal effect of specific projects cannot be
inferred from aggregate impacts. More fundamentally, it is
debatable whether cost-benefit analysis is the appropriate tool
for analysis of problems that are global in scope, non-marginal
in impact, cover centuries of time, and involve the fate of non-
human species as well as human beings.7
Nevertheless, real money has been and is being spent to
reduce both ODS and GHG emissions. (It should be noted at the
outset that this article will ignore those emissions-reduction
projects that can be undertaken at a pure profit by private-sector
firms or governmental agencies. These “no regrets” opportuni-
ties should be seized regardless of their environmental benefits
and are uncontroversial from a policy perspective.)8 The current
expenditures for emissions reductions provide a benchmark of
the “political willingness to pay” (“PWTP”) of present-day gov-
ernments.9 Political willingness to pay demonstrates collective
decisions to finance the most important functions of society such
as homeland security, national defense, public health, education,
and environment even when traditional cost-benefit calculations
are inappropriate or impossible. Although the decisions to invest
in ozone layer protection and climate change mitigation have
been made independently, the expenditures on these projects
provide a basis for estimating the current level of combined reg-
ulatory stringency of the two Protocols.
DEVELOPING A COMMON ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Consider a two-dimensional mapping of project characteris-
tics with reductions in ozone depletion potential (“ODP”) per
dollar spent on one axis and reductions in “life-cycle climate
performance” (“LCCP”)10 per dollar on the other. Data on the
money spent to eliminate or reduce ODSs are available in the
database maintained by the Multilateral Fund operating under
the Montreal Protocol,11 or from case studies of ODP reduction
projects undertaken by firms or government entities. From these
data, it is possible to infer the maximum PWTP to reduce ODP,
as well as various measures of the central tendency of PWTP.
Similarly, information is available on the cost of GHG reduction
projects undertaken by private firms, international projects certi-
fied under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, and the prices of CO2 emissions permits traded on the
European Climate Exchange. The ODP or LCCP reductions per
dollar spent on these projects can be represented in the kind of
diagram familiar to economists by points along the two axes as
shown in Figure 1. The circles on the axes represent the emis-
sions changes per dollar of the different projects (either ODP or
LCCP reductions).12 The square “dots” reflect the fact that most
ODP reductions have also reduced the global warming impact.
This occurs because either the replacement technologies use
gases with a lower direct global warming potential than the
CFCs they replaced, or the new technologies have been more
energy-efficient, or both. Nevertheless, it is possible for an ODP
reduction to be associated with an increase in GHG emissions so
that the “improvement” in LCCP/$ is negative. Cases of this type
would show square dots below the horizontal axis. 
The diagonal line AB, in Figure 1, is drawn to reflect the
combined degree of stringency implicit in the two regulatory
regimes. This line connects the central tendencies (e.g., the
means or medians) of the distributions of the LCCP reduction
project points and the ODP reduction project points. Shifting the
AB line towards the origin represents an increase in regulatory
stringency; if the axes had been drawn in units of $/ODP reduc-
tion and $/LCCP reduction, increasing regulatory stringency
would be expressed by a movement away from the origin.13 The
slope of AB is a rough measure of the dollar tradeoff between
LCCP reductions and ODP reductions embodied in current lev-
els of PWTP. 
The tradeoff line could also have been drawn in other ways.
For example, the dotted line A’B’ connects the most expensive
emissions reduction projects.14 It could be maintained that A’B’
more accurately reflects the PWTP frontier than AB because all
projects currently funded lie above and to the right of A’B’.
Alternatively, if it were decided under the successor to Kyoto
that there should be, for example, a global emissions charge of
$125/tonne of CO2, the anchoring point of the AB line on the
vertical axis would be at 0.008 (=1/125) with the LCCP axis
scaled in tonnes of CO2 equivalent per dollar. 
The area above and to the right of the AB line (or of the
A’B’ line, if the more inclusive definition of PWTP is being used
as the standard) represents those projects that are “clearly justi-
fied” at the current levels of regulatory stringency of the two
Protocols, while projects falling in the area below and to the left
of the line AB (or A’B’) are not so clearly justified. This is not to
suggest that projects on the axes below point A or to the left of
point B should not have been undertaken. Indeed, if A and B are
central tendencies, a considerable number of projects will lie on
either side of these points by definition. It may also be the case
that PWTP has not yet caught up with the socially desirable
degree of emissions reductions, so a shift of line AB (or A’B’)
down and to the left would improve general welfare. Note also
that if only the Montreal Protocol proceeds to a complete phase-
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out of the substances controlled under it, the line AB would
rotate about point A until it coincides with the vertical axis. Sim-
ilarly, a complete ODS phaseout under A’B’ would pivot on A’
until the point B’ coincides with the origin.
PRACTICAL POLICY APPLICATIONS OF A
COMMON ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
This conceptual framework offers two advantages. First, it
enables policy makers to evaluate projects with both global
warming and ozone-protection benefits in a unified way, given
the current levels of regulatory stringency implicit in the two
Protocols. Second, this framework shows how projects might be
compared in the cases in which one is not preferable to the other
along both dimensions. Thus, in Figure 2, Project C is preferable
to Project D because C results in more cost-effective reductions
in both ODP and LCCP. But what about comparisons between
Project D and Project E, or between Project D and Project F? All
three lie in the region above and to the right of line AB, so in one
sense all three should be undertaken at current levels of regula-
tory stringency. However, E is preferable to D at the current
tradeoff rate between LCCP/$ and ODP/$ as indicated by the
slope of AB. On the other hand, D is preferred to F at the AB
tradeoff rate, but F could be preferred to D if the slope of the
tradeoff line were steep enough (i.e. sufficiently negative). Fig-
ure 2 also shows the case of point G, a project with a large
enough ODP-reduction potential to be worth undertaking even
though it has an undesirable global warming impact.
This analytical framework has direct applicability to some
of the immediate issues that need to be considered in strengthen-
ing the Montreal Protocol. For example, the use of HCFC-123 in
large chillers has up to a 13.5 percent energy efficiency advan-
tage over the best alternatives.15 HCFC-123 also has a signifi-
cant refrigerant emission advantage because it is a liquid at
atmospheric pressure and temperature and operates at a partial
vacuum in air conditioning equipment. On the other hand, HFC-
134a (the best competing alternative) is a gas at atmospheric
pressure and temperature and operates at high pressure in air
conditioning equipment, increasing the risk of uncontrolled
emissions. The ODP of HCFC-123 is very low (0.012) but not
zero, while HFC-134a has an ODP of essentially zero.16 HCFC-
123 is scheduled for complete phaseout in 2030 in the developed
countries (with a 99.5 percent phaseout by 2020). However,
HFC-134a is not controlled under the Montreal Protocol, but
rather is controlled under the Kyoto Protocol as one of the basket
of greenhouse gases. HFC-134a has also been targeted by the
European Union for phaseout in automobile air conditioners.17
The lack of coordination between Montreal and Kyoto could dis-
courage building owners from selecting HCFC-123 systems as
the environmentally superior technology. With the substantial
energy efficiency advantage and near-zero refrigerant emissions
over the 30-year lifetime of a large chiller, selection of HCFC-
123 instead of HFC-134a in this application would fall in the
region above the line AB because of the very large LCCP gain
from the greater energy efficiency of the HCFC-123 chiller. This
is illustrated by point H in Figure 2, with the very small ODP of
the HCFC-123 chiller compared to an HFC-134a chiller indi-
cated by the placement of H slightly on the negative side of the
ODP/$ axis.18
Worldwide, in both developed and developing countries,
there are approximately 65,673 — 105,076 CFC chillers con-
taining 24,173 — 38,676 ODP-weighted tonnes of CFC.19 If all
of these CFC chillers were immediately replaced with HCFC-
123 chillers, global greenhouse gas emissions would be signifi-
cantly reduced. Destruction of the CFCs in the old equipment
could offset the lifecycle HCFC-123 emissions not only for the
replacement chillers, but also for chillers required in new con-
struction for decades to come. Mindful of the continuing climate
benefits, by the time the offsets run out the ozone layer is
expected to have largely recovered and might tolerate some ODS
emissions. 
The framework proposed in this article would automatically
incorporate policies designed to allow for destruction credits
associated with permission to use ODSs, either in a Montreal-
only framework or in an integrated framework requiring destruc-
tion sufficient to move a project to a combined regulatory
stringency boundary. Thus, in the preceding example of the
HCFC-123 chiller, the welfare improvement would be unam-
biguous (regardless of the slope of AB) if the HCFC-123 used in
the chiller were offset by destruction of an equivalent or greater
amount of ODP. As such, HCFC-123 chillers are unequivocally
environmentally superior if designed and maintained for supe-
rior energy efficiency and near-zero refrigerant emissions offset
by collection and destruction of ODSs currently contained in
existing equipment and foam products. 
This example shows how the Montreal Protocol could be
strengthened with an accelerated ODS phaseout while at the
same time contributing to climate protection by reducing green-
house gas emissions. All that is required is that controls for
developed countries and financing for developing countries
guide the choice of alternatives and substitutes for ODSs
towards those technologies offering the lowest LCCP. In addi-
tion, as in the chiller example, companies should be permitted to
offset HCFC-123 emissions by destruction of other ODSs when
significant improvements in energy consumption are available. 
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CONCLUSION
Several policy guidelines emerge from this approach. First,
it is environmentally and economically superior to choose alter-
natives or substitutes for ODSs that are ozone-safe (zero ODP)
and that also have lower direct and indirect greenhouse gas
emissions. Second, it can be economically preferable to choose
alternatives or substitutes to ODSs that have a small impact on
ozone (non-zero ODP) if it is judged, based on current or pro-
jected future PWTP, that the resulting lower direct and indirect
greenhouse gas emissions justify the ozone depletion. Third, it is
unequivocally preferable both economically and environmen-
tally to choose alternatives or substitutes to ODSs that have a
small impact on ozone (non-zero ODP) provided that impact is
offset by destruction of existing “legacy” ODS, the destruction
of which is not mandated by the Montreal Protocol and which is
not already required to be destroyed by other national or regional
legislation, and if the replacement technologies result in lower
direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions.
Using a unified analytical framework, we have shown how it
is possible to combine the political willingness to pay to protect
the ozone layer and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. This
approach can be applied to both the current effort to strengthen
the Montreal Protocol and the search for consensus on how to
move beyond Kyoto to mitigate climate change. Practical appli-
cations of this approach would favorably shift investment toward
technology that satisfies broad criteria of environmental protec-
tion and sustainable development and would use emissions trad-
ing to reduce the cost of both ozone and climate protection while
expanding the flexibility of business choice. Economic consider-
ations should never obscure the ethical principles that must pri-
marily guide these policies, but by eliminating perverse
incentives and avoiding expensive mistakes, economics has an
important role to play in promoting cost-effectiveness. The
approach outlined here retains the flexibility and openness to
new scientific understanding that have been hallmarks of the
Montreal Protocol’s success. In building on what has been
accomplished thus far, our obligation to future generations
requires nothing less than effective and intelligent integration of
measures for protection of the ozone layer and stabilization of
the climate system.
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